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Abstract 
Many written forms required by businesses and governments rely on honest reporting. Proof of 
honest intent is typically provided through signature at the end of—e.g., tax returns or insurance 
policy forms. Still, people sometimes cheat to advance their financial self-interests—at great 
costs to society. We test an easy-to-implement method to discourage dishonesty: signing at the 
beginning rather than at the end of a self-report, thereby reversing the order of the current 
practice. Using lab and field experiments, we find that signing before rather than after the 
opportunity to cheat makes ethics salient when it is needed most and significantly reduces 
dishonesty. 
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Introduction 
The annual tax gap between actual and claimed taxes due in the United States amounts to 
roughly $345 billion. The Internal Revenue Service estimates more than half this amount is due 
to individuals misrepresenting their income and deductions (1). Insurance is another domain 
burdened by the staggering cost of individual dishonesty; the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 
estimated that the overall magnitude of insurance fraud in the U.S. totaled $80 billion in 2006 
(2). The problem of curbing dishonesty in behaviors such as filing tax returns, submitting 
insurance claims, claiming business expenses or reporting billable hours is that they primarily 
rely on self-monitoring in lieu of external policing.  The current paper proposes and tests an 
efficient and simple measure to reduce such dishonesty. 
While recent findings have successfully identified an intervention to curtail dishonesty 
through introducing a code of conduct in contexts where previously there was none (3, 4), many 
important transactions already require signatures to confirm compliance to an expected standard 
of honesty. Nevertheless, as significant economic losses demonstrate (1, 2), the current practice 
appears insufficient in countering self-interested motivations to falsify numbers. We propose that 
a simple change of the signature location could lead to significant improvements in compliance.  
Even subtle cues that direct attention towards oneself can lead to surprisingly powerful 
effects on subsequent moral behavior (5-7). Signing is one way to activate attention to the self 
(8). However, typically, a signature is requested at the end. Building on Duval ﾠand ﾠWicklund’s ﾠ
theory of objective self-awareness (9), we propose and test that ﾠsigning ﾠone’s ﾠname ﾠprior to 
reporting information (rather than at the end) makes morality accessible right before it is most 
needed, which will consequently promote honest reporting. We propose that with the current 
practice of signing after reporting information, ﾠthe ﾠ“damage” ﾠhas ﾠalready ﾠbeen ﾠdone: ﾠ
immediately after lying, individuals quickly engage in various mental justifications, 4 
reinterpretations, and other ﾠ“tricks” such as suppressing thoughts about their moral standards that 
allow them to maintain a positive self-image despite having lied (3, 10, 11). That is, once an 
individual has lied, it is too late to direct their focus towards ethics through requiring a signature.  
In court cases, witnesses verbally declare their pledge to honesty before giving their 
testimonies—not after, perhaps for a reason. To the extent that written reports feel more distant 
and make it easier to disengage internal moral control than verbal reports, written reports are 
likely to be more prone to dishonest conduct (3, 10, 11). However, for both types of reports 
(verbal or written) we hypothesize a pledge to honesty to be more effective before rather than 
after self-reporting. Thus, in this work, we test an easy-to-implement method of curtailing fraud 
in written reports: signing a statement of honesty at the beginning rather than at the end of a self-
report that people know from the outset to require a signature.  
Results and Discussion 
Experiment 1 tested this intervention in the laboratory, using two different measures of 
cheating: self-reported earnings (income) on a math puzzles task wherein participants could 
cheat for financial gain (3), and travel expenses to the laboratory (deductions) claimed on a tax 
return form on research earnings. On the one-page form where participants reported their income 
and deductions, we varied whether participant signature was required at the top of the form or at 
the end. We also included a control condition wherein no signature was required on the form. 
We measured the extent to which participants overstated their income from the math 
puzzles task and the amount of deductions they claimed. All materials were coded with unique 
identifiers that were imperceptible to participants, yet allowed us ﾠto ﾠtrack ﾠeach ﾠparticipant’s ﾠtrue ﾠ
performance on the math puzzles against the performance underlying their income reported on 
the tax forms. The percentage of participants who cheated by over-claiming income for math 
puzzles they purportedly solved differed significantly across conditions: fewer cheated in the 5 
signature-at-the-top condition (37%) than in the signature-at-the-bottom and no-signature 
conditions (79% and 64%, respectively), ﾠχ
2(2, N=101)=12.58, p=.002, with no differences 
between the latter two conditions (p=.17). The results also hold when analyzing the average 
magnitude of cheating by condition; Figure 1 depicts the reported and actual performance, as 
measured by the number of math puzzles solved, for each condition, F(2,98)=9.21, p<.001. 
Finally, claims of travel expenses followed that same pattern and differed by condition, 
F(2,98)=5.63, p<.01, ﾠη2=.10. Participants claimed fewer expenses in the signature-at-the-top 
condition (M=$5.27, SD=4.43) compared to signature-at-the-bottom (M=$9.62, SD=6.20; p<.01) 
and the no-signature condition (M=$8.45, SD=5.92; p<.05), with no differences between the 
latter two conditions (p=.39). Thus, signing prior to reporting promoted honesty, while signing 
afterwards was the same as not signing at all. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Reported and actual number of math puzzles solved by condition, Experiment 1 (N=101). 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
 
Experiment 2 investigated the potential mechanism underlying the effect through a word-
completion task (12, 13) serving as an implicit measure of mental access to ethics-related 6 
concepts (4). Sixty university participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
signature-at-the-top or signature-at-the-bottom. Experiment 2 employed the same math puzzles 
and tax form procedure as in Experiment 1, but varied the incentives for performance on the 
math puzzles task and the tax rate. Finally, the one-page tax forms were modified to mimic the 
flow of actual tax reporting practices in the United States, and as in Experiment 1, all materials 
were imperceptibly coded with unique identifiers.   
 After filling out the tax forms, all participants received a list of six word fragments with 
missing letters. They were instructed to complete them with meaningful words. Three fragments 
(_ _ R A L, _ I _ _ _ E, and E _ _ _ C _ _) could potentially be completed by words related to 
ethics (moral, virtue, and ethical) or neutral words. We used the number of times these fragments 
were completed with ethics-related words as our measure of access to moral concepts. 
Similar to Experiment 1, the percentage of participants who cheated by overstating their 
performance on the math puzzles task was lower in the signature-at-the-top condition (37%, 11 
out of 30) than in the signature-at-the-bottom ﾠcondition ﾠ(63%, ﾠ19 ﾠout ﾠof ﾠ30), ﾠχ
2(1, N=60)=4.27, 
p<.04. The same pattern of results held when analyzing the magnitude of cheating (see Figure 2),  
t(58)=-2.07, p<.05, as well as the travel expenses that participants claimed on the tax return 
form, F(1,58)=7.76, p<.01, ﾠη
2=.12: they were lower in the signature-at-the-top condition 
(M=3.23, SD=2.73) than in the signature-at-the-bottom condition (M=7.06, SD=7.02).  
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Fig. 2. Reported and actual number of math puzzles solved by condition, Experiment 2 (N=60). 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
 
In the word-completion task, participants who signed before filling out the form 
generated more ethics-related words (M=1.40, SD=1.04) than those who signed after (M=0.87, 
SD=0.97), F(1,58)=4.22, p<.05, η
2=.07; this greater access to ethics-related concepts (our proxy 
for saliency of morality) significantly mediated the effect of assigned condition (signature-at-the-
top or signature-at-the-bottom) on cheating on the tax forms (bootstrapping with 10,000 
iterations (14): 95% confidence interval -1.85, -.04).  
Experiment 3 tested the effect of the signature location in a naturalistic setting. Partnering 
with an automobile insurance company in the Southeastern United States, we manipulated the 
policy review form, which asked customers to report the current odometer mileage of all cars 
insured by the company. Customers were randomly assigned to one of two forms, both of which 
required ﾠtheir ﾠsignature ﾠfollowing ﾠthe ﾠstatement: ﾠ“I ﾠpromise ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠinformation ﾠI ﾠam ﾠproviding ﾠ
is ﾠtrue.” ﾠHalf ﾠthe ﾠcustomers ﾠreceived ﾠthe original forms used by the insurance company, where 
their signature was required at the end of the form; the other half received our treatment forms, 8 
where they were required to sign at the beginning. The forms were identical in every other 
respect. Reporting lower odometer mileage indicated less driving, lower risk of accident 
occurrence, and therefore lower insurance premiums. We expected customers who signed at the 
beginning of the form to be more truthful and reveal higher usage than those who signed at the 
end. 
We compared the reported current odometer mileage on 13,488 completed policy forms 
for 20,741 cars to the latest records of each ﾠcar’s odometer mileage to calculate its usage 
(number of miles driven). Customers who signed at the beginning on average revealed higher 
usage (M=26,098.4, SD=12,253.4) than those who signed at the end (M=23,670.6, SD=12,621.4; 
F[1, 13,485]=128.63, p<.001). The difference was 2,427.8 miles per car. That is, asking 
customers to sign at the beginning of the form led to a 10.25% increase in implied miles driven 
(based on reported odometer readings) over the current practice of asking for a signature at the 
end. Follow-up analyses suggested that the higher usage in the signature-at-the-top condition was 
not due to more detailed reporting (down to the last digit) in comparison to customers who may 
have relied on simply rounding their odometer mileage in the signature-at-the-bottom condition. 
Thus, the simple change in signature location likely reduced the extent to which customers 
falsified mileage information in their own financial self-interest at cost to the insurance 
company—who must pass this expense on to all its policyholders, including honest customers 
who bear the ultimate burden of paying for the dishonesty of others. 
According to data from the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Highway Policy 
Information, the average annual amount of travel per vehicle in the U.S. was roughly 12,500 
miles in 2005 (15). This suggests that the average driver in our field experiment had been a 
customer with the insurance company for two years. We estimated the annual per-mile-cost of 
automobile insurance in the U.S. to range from four to ten cents (16), suggesting a minimum 9 
average difference of $48 in annual insurance premium per car between customers in the two 
conditions.  
The current practice of signing after reporting is insufficient. It is important to make 
morality salient, right before it is needed most, so that it can remain active during the most 
tempting moments. When signing comes after reporting, the morality train has already left the 
station. The power of our intervention is precisely due to the fact that it is such a gentle nudge 
(17): it does not impose on the freedom of individuals, it does not require the passage of new 
legislation, and it can profoundly influence behaviors of ethical and economic significance. In 
fact, because most self-reports already require signing a pledge to honesty – albeit not in the 
most effective location – the cost of implementing our intervention is minimal. Given the 
immense financial resources devoted to prevention, detection, and punishment of fraudulent 
behavior, a truly minimal intervention like the one used in our research seems costly not to 
implement – even if its effectiveness might wane over time as signing before reporting becomes 
prevalent ﾠand ﾠindividuals ﾠmay ﾠfind ﾠnew ﾠ“tricks” ﾠto ﾠdisengage ﾠinternal ﾠcontrol. 
Materials and Methods 
Experiment 1. Participants and procedure. One-hundred-and-one students and employees at 
local universities in the Southeastern United States (Mage=22.10, SD=4.98; 45% male; 82% 
students) completed the experiment for pay. They received a $2 show-up fee and had the 
opportunity to earn additional money throughout the experiment. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Signature-at-the-top of 
the tax return form (before filling it out); 2) Signature-at-the-bottom (after filling it out); or 3) 
No-signature (control). The statement that participants had to sign asked them to declare that 
they carefully examined the return and that to the best of their knowledge and belief it was 
correct and complete. 10 
At the beginning of each session, participants were given instructions in which they were 
informed that they would first complete a problem-solving task under time pressure (i.e., they 
would have five minutes to complete the task). In addition, the instructions included the 
following ﾠinformation, ﾠ“For ﾠthe ﾠproblem-solving task, you will be paid a higher amount than 
what we usually pay participants because you will be taxed on your earnings. You will receive 
more details after the problem-solving ﾠtask.” 
Problem-solving task. For this task (3), participants received a worksheet with 20 math 
puzzles, each consisting of 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 4.78) and a collection slip on which 
participants later reported their performance in this part of the experiment. Participants were told 
that they would have five minutes to find two numbers in each puzzle that summed to 10. For 
each pair of numbers correctly identified, they would receive $1, for a maximum payment of 
$20. Once the five minutes were over, the experimenter asked participants to count the number 
of correctly solved puzzles, note that number on the collection slip, and then submit both the test 
sheet and the collection slip to the experimenter. We assume respondents had no problems 
adding two numbers to ten, which means they should have been able to identify how many math 
puzzles they had solved correctly without requiring a solution sheet. Neither of the two forms 
(math puzzles test sheet and collection slip) had any information on it that could identify the 
participants. The sole purpose of the collection slip was for the participants themselves to learn 
how many puzzles in total they had solved correctly. 
Tax return form. After the problem-solving task, participants went to a second room to 
fill out a research study tax return form (based on IRS Form 1040). The one-page form we used 
was based on a typical tax return form. We varied whether participants were asked to sign the 
form at the top or bottom of the page (see Appendix A in the SI). Participants filled out the form 
by self-reporting their income (i.e., their performance on the math puzzles task) on which they 11 
paid a 20% tax (i.e., $0.20 for every dollar earned). In addition, they indicated how many 
minutes it took them to travel to the laboratory, and their cost of commute. These expenses were 
“credited” ﾠto ﾠtheir ﾠpost-tax earnings from the problem-solving task to compute their final 
payment. ﾠThe ﾠinstructions ﾠread: ﾠ“We ﾠwould ﾠlike ﾠto ﾠcompensate ﾠparticipants ﾠfor ﾠextra ﾠexpenses ﾠ
they ﾠhave ﾠincurred ﾠto ﾠparticipate ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠsession.” ﾠWe ﾠreimbursed ﾠthe ﾠtime ﾠto ﾠtravel ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠlab ﾠat ﾠ
$0.10 per minute (up to 2 hours or $12) and ﾠthe ﾠcost ﾠof ﾠparticipants’ ﾠcommute ﾠ(up ﾠto ﾠ$12). All 
the instructions and dependent measures appeared on one page to ensure that participants knew 
from the outset that a signature would be required. Thus, any differences in reporting could be 
attributed to the location of the signature.  
Payment structure. Given the features of the experiment, participants could make a total 
of $42—an amount which breaks down as follows: $2 show up fee, $20 on math puzzles task 
minus a 20% tax on income (i.e., $4), $12 as credits for travel time, and $12 as credits for cost of 
commute. 
Opportunity to cheat on the tax return form. The experiment was designed such that 
participants ﾠcould ﾠcheat ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠtax ﾠreturn ﾠform ﾠand ﾠget ﾠaway ﾠwith ﾠit ﾠby ﾠoverstating ﾠtheir ﾠ“income” ﾠ
from the problem-solving task and by inflating the travel expenses they incurred in order to 
participate in the experiment. When participants completed the first part of the experiment 
(problem-solving task), the experimenter gave them a tax return form and asked each participant 
to go to a second room with a second experimenter to fill out the tax form and receive their 
payments. The tax return form included a one-digit identifier (one digit in the top right of the 
form, in the code OMB No. 1555-0111) that was identical with the digit of one number of one 
math ﾠpuzzle ﾠof ﾠeach ﾠindividual’s ﾠworksheet ﾠ(which ﾠwas ﾠunique ﾠto ﾠeach ﾠindividual’s ﾠwork ﾠ
station). This difference was completely imperceptible to participants but allowed us to link the 
worksheet and the tax return form that belonged to the same participant. As a result, at the end of 12 
each session, we were able to compare actual performance on the problem-solving task and 
reported performance on the tax return form. If those numbers differed for any individual, this 
difference ﾠrepresented ﾠone ﾠmeasure ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠindividual’s ﾠlevel ﾠof ﾠcheating. 
First, we examined the percentage of participants who cheated by overstating their 
performance on the problem-solving task when asked to report it on the tax return form. This 
percentage varied across conditions, χ
2(2, N=101)=12.58, p=.002: The number of cheaters was 
lowest in the signature-at-the-top condition (37%, 13 out of 35), higher in the signature-at-the-
bottom condition (79%, 26 out of 33), and somewhat in between those two but more similar to 
the latter for the no-signature condition (64%, 21 out of 33).  
  Both actual and reported performances on the math puzzles task are shown in Figure 1. 
As depicted, the number of math puzzles over-reported in the tax return forms varied by 
condition, F(2,98)=9.21, p<.001, η
2=.16: it was lowest in the signature-at-the-top condition 
(M=0.77, SD=1.44) and higher in the signature-at-the-bottom condition (M=3.94, SD=4.07; 
p<.001) and in the no-signature condition (M=2.52, SD=3.12; p<.05). The difference between 
these two latter conditions was only marginally significant (p<.07).  
The credits for travel expenses (travel time and costs of commute) that participants 
claimed in the tax return forms also varied by condition, F(2,98)=5.63, p<.01, η
2=.10 and 
followed the same pattern: Participants claimed less expenses in the signature-at-the-top 
condition (M=5.27, SD=4.43) than in the signature-at-the-bottom (M=9.62, SD=6.20; p<.01) and 
the no-signature (control) conditions (M=8.45, SD=5.92; p<.05). The difference between these 
two latter conditions was not significant (p=.39). These results suggest that the effect of the 
signature location is driven by the signing-at-the-top condition: signing prior to a self-reporting 
task promoted honest reporting. Signing afterwards did not promote cheating. In effect, it was 
the same as having no signature at all. 13 
Experiment 2. Participants and procedure. Sixty students and employees at local universities in 
the Southeastern United States (Mage=21.50, SD=2.27; 48% male; 90% students) completed the 
experiment for pay. They received a $2 show-up fee and had the opportunity to earn additional 
money throughout the experiment. 
Experiment 2 employed one between-subjects factor with two levels: signature-at-the-top 
and signature-at-the-bottom. The experiment employed the same task and procedure of 
Experiment 1 but varied the incentives for the problem-solving task, the tax rate, and the tax 
return forms participants completed. Namely, participants in this experiment were paid $2 (rather 
than $1) for each math puzzle successfully solved and were taxed at a higher rate of 50 percent. 
Finally, the tax forms were modified such that they mimicked the flow of actual tax reporting 
practices in the United States: deductions (commuting time and costs) were first subtracted from 
gross income (earnings from math puzzles task) to compute taxable income, and then taxes were 
paid on this total adjusted amount (see Appendix B in the SI for an example of the forms used).  
After filling out the tax return forms, participants were asked to complete a word-
completion task. Participants received a list of six word fragments with letters missing and were 
asked to fill in the blanks to make complete words by using the first word that came to mind. 
Following prior research measuring implicit cognitive processes (12, 13), we used this word-
completion task to measure accessibility of moral concepts. Three of the word fragments (_ _ R 
A L, _ I _ _ _ E, and E _ _ _ C _ _) could potentially be completed by words related to ethics 
(moral, virtue, and ethical); these were our measures of access to moral concepts. 
Level of cheating. We first examined the percentage of participants who cheated by 
overstating their performance on the math puzzles task when filling out the tax return form. This 
percentage was lower in the signature-at-the-top condition (37%, 11 out of 30) than in the 
signature-at-the-bottom condition (63%, 19 out of 30), χ
2(1, N=60)=4.27, p<.04.  14 
  Figure 2 depicts actual performance on the math puzzles task and reported performance 
on the tax return form, by condition. This difference (a measure for cheating) was lower in the 
signature-at-the-top condition (M=1.67, SD=2.78) than in the signature-at-the-bottom condition 
(M=3.57, SD=4.19), t(58)=-2.07, p<.05.  
  The deductions participants reported on the tax return form followed the same pattern and 
varied significantly by condition, F(1,58)=7.76, p<.01, η
2=.12: they were lower in the signature-
at-the-top condition (M=3.23, SD=2.73) than in the signature-at-the-bottom condition (M=7.06, 
SD=7.02).  
Word-fragment task. Participants who signed prior to filling out the tax form generated 
more ethics-related words (M=1.40, SD=1.04) than those who signed after filling out the form 
(M=0.87, SD=0.97), F(1,58)=4.22, p<.05, η
2=.07, suggesting that ethics is more salient when 
participants signed prior to—rather than after—the temptation to cheat. 
Mediation analyses. We also tested whether ethics-related concepts (our proxy for 
saliency of moral standards) mediated the effect of condition on the extent of cheating. Both 
condition and the number of ethics-related concepts were entered into a linear regression model 
predicting extent of cheating measured by the level of over-reporting of income. The mediation 
analysis revealed that the effect of condition was significantly reduced (from β=-.262, p<.05 to 
β=-.143, p=.23), and that the number of ethics-related concepts was a significant predictor of 
cheating (β=-.456, p<.001). Using the bootstrapping method (with 10,000 iterations) 
recommended by Preacher and Hayes (4), we tested the significance of the indirect effect of 
condition on dishonest behavior through the activation of ethics-related concepts. The 95% 
confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include zero (-1.85, -.04), suggesting significant 
mediation.  15 
Additionally, we computed the z-score measure for both the deductions claimed and the 
magnitude of cheating on the math puzzles for each participant. We averaged the two measures 
to ﾠform ﾠan ﾠindex ﾠfor ﾠeach ﾠindividual’s ﾠextent ﾠof ﾠcheating. ﾠBoth ﾠcondition and the number of 
ethics-related concepts were entered into a linear regression model predicting extent of cheating 
measured by this composite index. The mediation analysis revealed that the effect of treatment 
condition ﾠwas ﾠsignificantly ﾠreduced ﾠ(from ﾠβ=-.424, p=.001 ﾠto ﾠβ=-.344, p=.005), and that the 
number of ethics-related ﾠconcepts ﾠwas ﾠa ﾠsignificant ﾠpredictor ﾠof ﾠcheating ﾠ(β=-.308, p=.011). 
Using the bootstrapping method with 10,000 iterations (4), we found that the 95% confidence 
interval for the indirect effect did not include zero (-0.29, -.01), suggesting significant mediation.  
Using an implicit measure of ethical saliency, this experiment shows that signing before 
the opportunity to cheat increases the saliency of moral standards compared to signing after 
having had the opportunity to cheat; subsequently, this discourages cheating.  
Experiment 3. Participants and procedure. We conducted a field experiment with an insurance 
company in the Southeastern United States asking some of their existing customers to report 
their odometer reading. 
When a new policy is issued, each customer submits information about the exact current 
odometer mileage of all cars insured under their policy, along with other information. For our 
audit experiment, we sent out automobile policy review forms to policy holders—randomly 
assigning them to either the original form used by the insurance company or to our re-designed 
form.  The original form asked customers to sign the statement: ﾠ“I ﾠpromise ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠinformation ﾠI ﾠ
am providing is true,” ﾠwhich appeared at the bottom of the form (i.e., after having completed it; 
control condition), while our re-designed form asked customers to sign that same statement but 
at the top of the form (i.e., before filling it out; treatment condition). Otherwise, the forms were 
identical. 16 
The data file that we received from the insurance company included a random identifier 
for each policy, an indication of the experimental condition, and two odometer readings for each 
car covered (a maximum of four per policy).  The first odometer reading was based on the 
mileage information the insurance company previously had on file, while the second was the 
current odometer reading that customers reported. The data file did not have the date of the first 
odometer reading (it also did not have any of the other information requested on the policy 
review forms). Consequently, our usage measure was somewhat noisy, as the miles driven per 
car have been accumulated over varying unknown time periods. However, because we randomly 
assigned customers to our two experimental conditions, such noise should be evenly represented 
in both conditions. To ﾠcalculate ﾠeach ﾠcar’s usage or number of miles driven (our main dependent 
variable), we subtracted the odometer reading that was in the ﾠinsurance ﾠcompany’s ﾠdatabase ﾠfrom 
the self-reported current odometer reading we received from our audit forms. 
While there was no explicit statement on the policy review forms linking car usage to 
insurance premiums, policy holders had an incentive to report lower usage: the fewer miles 
driven, the lower the accident risk, and the lower their insurance premium. Thus, when filling out 
the automobile policy review form, customers likely faced a dilemma between honestly 
indicating the current odometer mileage, and dishonestly indicating lower odometer mileage to 
reduce their insurance premium. We hypothesized that signing before self-reporting makes ethics 
salient right when it is needed most. Therefore, we expected that customers who signed the 
policy review form first, before filling it out, would more likely be truthful, and reveal higher 
usage, compared to those who signed at the end, after filling it out. 
Completed forms were received from 13,488 policies for a total of 20,741 cars. A single 
policy could cover up to four cars; 52% of policies had one car, 42% had two cars, 5% had three 
cars and less than 0.3% had four cars. If a customer’s ﾠpolicy had more than one car, we averaged 17 
the reported odometer mileages for all cars on the same policy. As hypothesized, controlling for 
the number of cars per policy (F[1,13485]=2.184, p=.14), the  calculated usage (based on 
reported odometer readings) was significantly higher among customers who signed at the 
beginning of the form (M=26,098.4, SD=12,253.4) than among those who signed at the end of 
the form (M=23,670.6, SD=12,621.4; F[1,13485]=128.631, p<.001). The average difference 
between the two conditions was 2,427.8 miles. The results also hold for the usage of the first car 
only (signature-at-the-top: M=26,204.8 miles, SD=14,226.3 miles, signature-at-the-bottom: 
M=23,622.5 miles, SD=14,505.8 miles; t[13486]=10.438, p<.001). 
Asking customers to sign at the beginning of the form led to a 10.25% increase in the 
calculated miles driven over the current practice of asking for a signature at the end. An 
alternative explanation for our findings could be that this difference is due to extra diligence of 
customers in the treatment condition relative to customers in the control condition, rather than 
higher rates of deliberate falsification of information among customers in the control condition. 
That is, perhaps those who signed at the top of the form were actually checking their odometers, 
while those who signed at the bottom of the form simply estimated their mileage without actually 
checking their cars. To address this possibility, we compared the last digits of the odometer 
mileage that customers in the two conditions reported. Specifically, we ran analyses examining 
whether the two conditions differed in the number of instances wherein reported odometer 
mileages ended with 0, 5, 00, 50, 000, or 500. Numbers that end with these digits indicate a 
higher likelihood that customers simply estimated their mileage. We detected no statistically 
significant differences between our two conditions in the instances in which these endings 
appeared (pooled measure: treatment: 19.9% vs. control: 20.8%; 
2= 2.5, p=.12).  
An important consequence of false reporting of this type is that the costs extend beyond 
the insurer to its entire customer base—including the honest policyholders—who bear the 18 
ultimate burden of paying for others’ ﾠdishonesty. Using a field experiment, we demonstrate that a 
simple change in the location of a signature request can significantly influence the extent to 
which people on average will misreport information to advance their own self-interest.   19 
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Figure Legend 
Fig. 1. Reported and actual number of math puzzles solved by condition, Experiment 1 (N=101). 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). 
Fig. 2. Reported and actual number of math puzzles solved by condition, Experiment 2 (N=60). 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean (SEM). 